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Does Copyright Have Limits? Eldred v Ashcroft and 
its Aftermath 
 
PROFESSOR LAWRENCE LESSIG 
 
The last time I had the chance to stand in a Supreme Court and asked, 
“does copyright have limits?”, I was standing on that side of the Bench and 
several of the Justices got the answer wrong. I am very eager to be standing 
on this side of the Bench and asking the very same question, and even more 
encouraged to learn that in Australia the question may get a serious answer. 
 
Let me put this in context. Copyright law begins in the Anglo-American 
tradition in 1662. The Licensing Act of 1662 established monopolies for 
publishers in England in cooperation with the Crown, to guarantee that 
those who had the power to speak would use the press in a way that either 
benefited the Crown’s political interest or the publisher’s monetary 
interests. That statute expired in 1695 and what followed from the 
perspective of the publishers was chaos. 
 
From the perspective of the public, what followed was freedom. There 
were no protected monopolies for publishing; there increasingly became 
competition in publishing and that competition was scary to these 
publishers so they increasingly lobbied in a frenetic way to re-establish 
monopoly controls. They were the inspiration for a scene from Wizard of 
Oz and by 1709 they had succeeded. In 1709, Parliament passed a statute to 
re-establish monopoly power in the context of copyrights. That was the 
Statute of Anne. 
 
This Statute was originally proposed to establish monopoly for copyright 
for an unlimited term. It was to be perpetual copyright. But in the course of 
its passage through the Parliament the proceeding was amended in a way 
that terrified the publishers because the amendment stated that copyrights 
would extend for fourteen years for new works (renewable), and for 
existing works twenty-one years. The critical question for us, hundreds of 
years after this decision was made, is why would they limit copyrights? 
What was the purpose? From my perspective, our first intuition would be 
the idea of free speech; that it was important to limit copyright to promote 
speech. In fact, free speech had absolutely nothing to do with the ideas of 
limiting copyright terms. 
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The core motivating idea was the restriction of monopoly. The English, of 
course, had learned to hate monopolies; they had essentially fought a war 
over Crown granted monopolies. As the United States Supreme Court 
decided in one of its really good intellectual property decisions, the Statute 
of Anne was written against the backdrop of practices – eventually curtailed 
by the Statute of Monopolies – of the Crown in granting monopolies to 
Court favourites in goods or businesses which had long before been 
enjoyed by the public. For example, the printing of the Bible was a 
monopoly granted by the Crown. Writs of Courts of Common Pleas were a 
monopoly controlled by and rented by the Crown. Clay pipes were granted 
monopoly control, gold and silver thread and most famously, of course, 
playing cards. This tradition of granting monopolies over stuff that already 
existed created the ire in the British people that led to a revolution against 
these monopolies. These monopolies for existing things were the product of 
endless lobbying by those who produced those existing things, lobbying to 
protect their monopoly. 
 
The key insight that economics has given us, about the dynamic that this 
public choice problem presents, is that the monopolist will be willing to 
stand the net present value of his monopoly to protect his monopoly against 
loss from the government no longer supporting it. To protect monopolies 
they will invest as much money as they expect to guarantee a continued 
control over that resource. The 1656 Parliament ended it with respect to 
ordinary products in the Statute of Monopolies. You could grant 
monopolies under this Statute only for new works in the sense of a patent 
as our current law gives. Because the British knew the corruption of 
permitting monopolies to be granted for existing works, they regulated 
around it. They forbade it in the context of real goods. The Statue of 
Monopolies excepted from its control publishers and in 1709 Parliament 
removed that exemption. Publishers were included within the scope of 
regulated Acts to ensure monopoly powers would not be too great. 
 
There are many publishers today who have inspired the love of the public. 
We do not have a clear sense of who the publishers were for the British at 
this time. We should remember that publishers at this time were hated. 
John Milton describes them this way, “Publishers are all patentees and 
monopolisers and the trade of book selling . . . men who do not labour in an 
honest profession, to learning is indebted”.10 These were a class of 
                                                 
10 Phillip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (1937) 31 
cited in Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture (2005) E-prints in Library and Information 
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monopolists, particularly hated at the time. The London Monopoly is 
referred to as the Conger which worked to keep prices to British culture 
high and to restrict access to new works. The Statute of Monopolies in 1709 
granted them a twenty-one year monopoly over existing works as a way to 
buy them off. The idea was that for twenty-one more years their existing 
monopolies would continue, but in twenty-one years those monopolies 
would end. What we all expected, of course, was that in twenty-one years 
they would come back to fight again to extend their monopolies. When 
these initial monopolies did expire, the publishers did return to try to 
extend them. 
 
In 1735 and 1737 they proposed extensions of existing terms. Parliament 
rebuffed these extensions. Here is one pamphlet response: 
 
I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not hold 
as well for granting it again and again as often as the Old ones 
Expire so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be establishing a 
perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the Eye of the 
Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to 
Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the 
Publick; and all this only to increase the private Gain of the 
Booksellers.11 
 
These extensions were rejected. In fact three times they were rejected, 
leaving the publishers to turn to the next forum for extending their 
monopoly power – the Courts. 
 
In the Courts it would not be possible for the publishers to plead for their 
own interests, hated as they were. Instead they pleaded for the interests of 
the authors. It was the author’s rights the publisher was trying to promote. 
These rights, they said, were natural and as natural rights they were 
protected by Common Law. Furthermore they should be perpetual. The 
publishers’ concern for authors is an interesting type of concern. Lyman 
Ray Patterson described it as, “the publishers had as much concern for 
authors as cattle ranchers have for cattle”.12 They were using the authors to 
advance their interests. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Science <http://eprints.rclis.org/archive/00002988/01/freecult.pdf> at 28 August 2006 
(hereinafter Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture).  
11 Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture.  
12 Lyman Ray Patterson, ‘Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use’ (1987) Vanderbilt Law 
Review 40, 28, cited in Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture. 
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They would fight for their cattle in this context, and that particular battle 
eventually resolved this conflict in British history by a Scot, Alexander 
Donaldson. In 1750 he set up in Edinburgh a publishing house for public 
domain books, meaning books whose copyright under the Statute of Anne 
had expired. The Conger sent him a very clear note – stop publishing your 
books, our copyrights are perpetual. Donaldson responded in a particularly 
Scottish way. He decided to move his business to London and sell books in 
London that were sold at 30 to 50 percent less than the going price. He did 
not believe he had to pay any royalties because he believed these books 
were in the public domain. 
 
The Conger organised a series of law suits against Donaldson, designed to 
stop him and others from exercising what they thought to be their right 
under the Statute of Anne, and they won a series of early victories in the 
Common Law Courts. The most famous of these victories was Miller v 
Taylor,13 which in 1769 upheld the idea that these terms were perpetual. 
Miller was a merchant who had purchased the rights to James Thomson’s 
The Seasons. He sued Taylor who was reproducing Thomson’s poems 
without permission from Miller. Lord Mansfield upheld the continuation of 
the Common Law copyright, holding that while the Statute of Anne 
supplanted Common Law copyright, it did not replace it. Copyright, 
according to Lord Mansfield, was perpetual. 
 
This was the first round. For those who have lost first rounds, there is 
always hope for a second round. There was one in this case. On Miller’s 
death, his estate sold the rights he had to a guy named Thomas Beckett. 
Donaldson then decided to take Beckett on directly by selling these works 
in the market without permission of the copyright owner. Beckett sued 
Donaldson. The House of Lords got the case in 1774 and decided that the 
Statute of Anne was meant to displace the Common Law, and that 
copyrights were, in fact, limited. Donaldson won in the House of Lords, 
and the Statute of Anne was held to mean that copyrights end. For the first 
time in British history, the works of William Shakespeare, John Milton, 
Francis Bacon and Samuel Johnson and many others passed into the public 
domain. Once in the public domain, the prices for works fall and, more 
importantly, competition among publishers increases, meaning the 
opportunity for new authors to find ways to publish their work increases as 
well. 
 
                                                 
13 (1769) 4 Burr. 2303 (KB). 
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The view of this result was of course different depending on where you 
came from. In Edinburgh there was general celebration. No private cause 
had so engrossed the attention of the public. One paper wrote: 
 
And none has been tried before the House of Lords, in the decision of 
which so many individuals were interested, great rejoicing in Edinburgh 
upon the victory of her literary property, bonfires and illuminations.14 
 
In London the view was a little bit different. “Disaster,” wrote one major 
paper: 
 
By the above decision nearly 200,000 pounds worth of works was honestly 
purchased at public sale in which was yesterday thought property, is now 
reduced to nothing. The booksellers of London and Westminster, many of 
whom sold estates and houses to purchase copyright, are, in a manner, 
ruined and those, who after many years’ industry thought they had acquired 
a competency to provide for their families, now find themselves without a 
shilling to devise to their successors.15 
 
In 1789, the United States copied Britain, and passed a Constitution. 
Article 1 Section 8 Clause 8 says that Congress shall have the power: 
 
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries. 
 
‘To promote the progress of science’ – that is the power – by ‘securing for 
limited Time’ – that is the restriction – ‘the exclusive Right’.  
 
This clause has two parts. You get the power to do A through the means of 
B to promote the progress of science by securing the right for a limited 
time. The idea of promoting was drawn directly from the Statute of 
Monopolies. The idea of limited times comes from the Statute of Anne. 
 
In 1790 the Congress enacted a statute that granted copyright owners a 14-
year term renewable once at the end of the first term and for existing works 
the same term was granted. Again, the motivation for these limitations was 
not free speech. The motivation for these restrictions was to limit 
monopoly. This birth of copyright often creates a misunderstanding 
                                                 
14 Reported in the Edinburgh Advertiser and cited in Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture.  
15 Reported in the Morning Chronicle and cited in Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture. 
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because we do not really recognise the copyright to which the framers of 
the US Constitution were speaking. The copyright they were speaking of 
was tiny in respect to the copyright we have today. 
 
The difference can be seen across a number of dimensions. Let us think of 
four: the term, the scope, the reach, and the force. Originally, the copyright 
term was relatively short – 14 years – renewable once. The scope of the 
copyright was limited to particular kinds of works: maps, charts and books. 
To get a copyright within that scope you had to go through a series of 
formalities. You had to register the work, you had to mark the work, you 
had to deposit the work and, after an initial term, you had to renew the 
copyright. The reach of the copyright pertained only to publishing. It 
explicitly said ‘publishing’ not ‘copying’ which meant that it was 
essentially regulating commercial actors, and the force of copyright was 
always mitigated by the courts. Its application was only as far as courts said 
it should apply. 
 
These narrow contours around the regulation called copyright have seen 
significant change. First in term: the copyright term changed, both in its 
length and its structure in the United States. In its length it went from 14 
years in 1790 which could then be multiplied if the term was continued to a 
maximum of 28. In 1831 the maximum term went to 42 years. In 1909 the 
maximum term went to 56 years. Beginning in 1962 the copyright term for 
existing works automatically increased, in fact eleven times, until in 1998 it 
was extended to 95 years for existing works. That is the difference in term. 
But the term changes in its structure too. Before 1976 to get the maximum 
term of copyright protection, you had to go through two grants of 
copyright. The initial term could be renewed and required an affirmative 
act. Between 80 and 90 percent of copyists, depending on the work or the 
particular period of history, never took that affirmative step. They did not 
renew their copyright because, presumably, the burden of renewing was not 
worth the benefit from the additional term. 
 
In 1976 that changed. We adopted the international standard of one term, 
one grant of copyright, meaning that to get the initial copyright was to get 
the full term of protection, meaning in the United States the copyright term 
effectively tripled in 30 years. In 1973 the average term of copyright was 
32.2 years, because 85 percent of copyrights never renewed after the initial 
term. Today the average term is the maximum term, which is 95 years. 
That is the change in term. 
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Think about the change in scope. Originally I said the scope was maps, 
charts and books. It has now been extended essentially to all creative work 
reduced to a tangible form, and appropriately so, because it should cover 
the widest range of creativity where there is a need for incentives to create. 
But the significant difference not remarked in our history so far is the 
change in the formalities and the consequence of that change. Between 
1790 and 1800, no more than 10 percent of published work ever registered 
initially for copyright protection, meaning immediately 90 percent of that 
work was in the public domain. After the initial term of 14 years, over 90 
percent did not renew the copyright, meaning after 14 years, 99 percent of 
work published had entered the public domain. 
 
Between 1800 and 1976 the data is not as conclusive, not as certain. 
Probably 25 percent of all work published was actually registered for 
copyright after the initial term. Less than 3 percent of that work remained 
under copyright protection, meaning almost 97 percent was in the public 
domain. Copyright was a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative 
process – that part relating to commercial creativity. This changed in 1976 
in the United States as formalities were abolished, which meant that 
copyright went from regulating a sub-set of published work to regulating 
all published work automatically, all creative work automatically, and after 
28 years continued to regulate all creative work automatically. There is no 
filter to separate out work which needs the benefit of continued protection; 
protection is automatic and for the full term. 
 
Think about the change in reach. Copyright law was born to regulate 
commercial publishers. It regulated the copying of the same book, meaning 
it did not regulate derivative works; those were free. And it did not regulate 
in the non-commercial space, which I am defining as those published 
works that did not register for the original copyright. In the first 100 years 
of copyright law this changed in just one way: transformative works, 
derivative works, are included within the scope of the original monopoly. 
Again, this extended only to commercial publication. Then in 1909, 
accidentally, because under copyright law this was an inappropriate way to 
refer to what they were trying to do, the word ‘publish’ was changed to 
‘copy’. The law regulated as far as existing technology for existing 
copying. It did not matter in 1909, because in 1909 the technologies for 
copying were machines like printing presses. But it created a potential that 
has produced the most dramatic change in copyright law in our history 
because the law now was regulating for men with machines and as ‘men 
with machines’ turned into ‘women with machines’ and then ‘many more 
people with machines’ the scope of the regulation changed. In 1970, as 
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Xerox machines become more and more common, the scope of the law 
changed. 
 
Something quite dramatic happened as the Internet entered our space. We 
can see that drama by thinking about copyright’s regulation of the copies in 
the context of an ordinary book. Review all the possible uses of a book. A 
bunch of these uses are unregulated by copyright law, for example: 
• reading a book does not produce a copy. It is therefore unregulated by 
copyright law. 
• Giving a book does not produce a copy. It is therefore unregulated by 
copyright law. 
• Selling a book does not produce a copy. It does not get regulated by 
copyright law. 
• Sleeping on a book does not produce a copy. It is not regulated by 
copyright law. 
 
At the core of these unregulated uses is a set of uses that are properly 
regulated by copyright law. For example publishing a book requires the 
permission of the copyright owner. In the American tradition, there is also 
a thin slither of exceptions called fair uses which otherwise would have 
been regulated by copyright law because they produced a copy but which 
the law says should not be regulated by copyright law because it is essential 
these uses remain free. You can quote my book, meaning copy my words, 
in a totally idiomatic review – I tell you many people have done that so far. 
I cannot control you, nor should I be able to control you because the law 
says these uses of my words are fair uses even if I, the copyright owner, do 
not authorise them.  
 
That is the story balanced as it was before the entrance of the internet. The 
internet, which by its design, by its architecture, produces this single fact: 
every act is a copy. You cannot do anything on a digital network without 
producing a copy. To read a book produces a copy. Every act with a digital 
object is an act which produces a copy, meaning automatically that the 
scope of this regulation is extended. That which before was presumptively 
unregulated now is presumptively within the scope of the law. There may 
be exceptions – fair use is one – but the base line has changed because of 
this technical feature of the way in which copyright law interacts with 
digital networks. Ordinary uses are presumptively controlled.  
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Originally copyright laws regulated through law, but increasingly that is no 
longer the case. It is technology that regulates copyrighted works. A good 
example of this is my favourite version of my Adobe e-book reader, 
Middlemarch,16 a book in the public domain. When you click on the 
permissions behind Middlemarch you may print 10 pages every 10 days 
and you may use the read aloud button to listen to this book. These are the 
restrictions on public domain books. With Aristotle’s Politics,17 which did 
not have much of a copyright life in the United States, you may not copy 
any text selections to the clipboard, you may not print any pages but you 
may use the read aloud button to listen to this book. To my great 
embarrassment, for my book, The Future of Ideas, you may not copy any 
text selections; you may not print any pages; and don’t you dare use the 
read aloud button to listen to my book. Now the point is, where do these 
controls come from? 
 
They certainly do not come from the law. You cannot exercise these 
controls on public domain books and you certainly can not restrict any 
person’s ability to read a book aloud, even if it is copyrighted. The point is, 
these controls come through the technology which the content is embedded 
in, and as this technology develops to include Digital Rights Management 
(DRM) technologies, the scope of this control will increase, and 
increasingly, this control is backed up by the law. My favourite example is 
Sony’s Aibo dog. This is a little creature that you can buy for about 
US$1500, and you can teach it to do all sorts of tricks. Some fans decided 
they wanted to set up a little fan site that gave information to others about 
how to teach their dog to do tricks. 
 
They taught people how to hack their Aibo dog, not with a machete but 
with code, to teach the dog to dance jazz. When they did this, they received 
a letter from Sony that said, “your site contains information providing the 
means to circumvent Aibo wares copy protocol, constituting a violation of 
the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA”.18 To circumvent the 
code’s restriction on your ability to do stuff with your dog is a crime, even 
if the underlying act is not a crime. Let me assure you I know foreign 
audiences are often confused about it – it is not a crime in the United States 
to dance jazz. Outside of Georgia, even your dog can dance jazz without 
legal regulation. Here code ‘controls’ and the law says you cannot 
circumvent the code even for a legitimate purpose. 
                                                 
16 George Eliot (1872). 
17 Aristotle (350 BC). 
18 Letter sent to aibopet.com and cited in Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture. 
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Add these changes together – term, scope, reach and force. Then add into 
the mix a topic which I know you are all familiar with, increasing media 
concentration. If you put all these forces together you reach a conclusion 
which is very hard for us to accept about who we have become, because 
never in the history of our tradition have fewer exercised more legal control 
over the development and spread of our culture than now. Not even when 
copyrights were perpetual, because they only regulated the single copying 
of a book. Never has the scope of regulation been as powerful and never 
before has it extended as widely. This is the change that copyright has 
undergone – radically transforming the nature of its regulation in just a 
couple of hundred years. 
 
In 1998 Eric Eldred decided he wanted to become a civil disobedient. 
Eldred was running an online website, which was publishing public domain 
materials and in 1998 he expected to publish the work of Robert Frost, 
because a series of Frost poems were to enter the public domain then. 
Congress decided in 1998 to extend the term of copyrights by 20 years, 
including existing copyrights, and Eric Eldred announced he was going to 
fight this change by just violating the law. A naïve law professor (namely 
me) called up Eric Eldred and told him this was a really bad idea, that 
copyright law was an extraordinarily punitive law to break in the United 
States, and this mode of testing it was likely to land him in prison, rather 
than achieving his ultimate objective of publishing this work freely. We 
said we would help him sue – to declare the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Extension Act unconstitutional, the Act otherwise known in the public press 
as the ‘Mickey Mouse Protection Act’. 
 
Our claim was that this violated the progress clause. The core idea behind 
the progress clause is a quid pro quo – ‘this for that’. We grant you a 
copyright in exchange for your creative work. In 1923 the Government said 
to Frost, “we’ll give you a 56 year monopoly, if you create something new” 
and Frost said, “fine” and he did create amazing poems and literature which 
earned the benefit of that 56 year monopoly. But when that monopoly was 
extended for works that already exist, the quid pro quo of this for that was 
breached. This was for nothing because the work existed that the copyright 
was being extended for, and no matter what Congress did it would not get 
Robert Frost to produce any new work in 1923. This was a monopoly in 
exchange for nothing. It is like a contract with the State to build a bridge 
for a million dollars and then at the end of your completion, you say to the 
State, “I want two million dollars before I deliver the bridge to you”. 
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This extension of course was part of a pattern. There were eleven 
extensions of existing terms in the last forty years. Always these extensions 
occurred as famous copyrights were about to expire. That dynamic is 
totally predictable in a world where it is permitted to extend monopolies for 
existing works, because those who have the benefit of the monopoly for the 
existing work are willing to spend the net present value to guarantee that 
monopoly is extended. In a Supreme Court, seven, eight thousand miles 
away, the question was asked, “Are there limits on this copyright?” and the 
Supreme Court answered, “No”. What Congress was doing was OK. 
“There was no reason to believe”, the Supreme Court wrote, “that these 
copyright terms would be perpetual”. They may be perpetual along the 
instalment plan, but all the Supreme Court believed the Constitution 
required was that Congress should give the perpetual terms in particular 
chunks. Congress was free to do this, the limited times clause 
notwithstanding. At least, and here is the silver lining, so long as it does not 
change the ‘traditional contours of copyright’. 
 
There were two dissents in that case: Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens. 
Justice Breyer’s was the more ambitious dissent. He asserted that the 
existing copyright term was already a perpetual term. He asserted this 
because he could do some math, and what he calculated with his math was 
that a 95 year term, was the equivalent of 99.9998 percent of the value of a 
perpetual term. If you have the value of a perpetual term, and you put on 
the top of it the 95 year term, it already was 99.9998 percent of the value of 
the perpetual term. And Justice Breyer calculated that 98 percent of the 
work whose copyright was being extended was no longer commercially 
available anyway. This was an extension for a very small proportion of 
work, ignoring the burden on the balance of work. 
 
Justice Breyer’s dissent inspired follow-on litigation. This is what we call 
Eldred Version 2, the case of Kahle v Ashcroft,19 which the Ninth Circuit is 
scheduled to hear arguments some time in 2005. The insight motivating 
Kahle is that 98 percent of authors are not benefiting from the copyright 
term extension. This case focused on the 98 percent and its focus is to use 
the First Amendment to assert limitations on Congress’ power to restrict 
access to that work. How do we have the right to use the First Amendment? 
The silver lining gives us that right, because what the Court said in Eldred 
is that so long as Congress does not change the traditional contours of 
                                                 
19 Decision of the Ninth Circuit was handed down 22 January 2007, and is available at 
<http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/1FABEA163F4C714A8825726B00
5A12F0/$file/0417434.pdf?openelement> (accessed 7 February 2007). 
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copyright further First Amendment reviews are not required. By 
implication, if Congress changes the traditional contours of copyright 
further First Amendment review is required. As I have demonstrated to 
you, Congress has changed, in as fundamental a way as possible, the 
traditional contours of copyright by changing the system of formalities. 
 
For 186 years of our history, formalities defined the scope of copyright’s 
regulation and that scope, of course, was tiny compared to its scope today, 
guaranteeing that its force would be felt by a narrow, filtered class of works 
and the balance of works would enter the public domain. That changed 
from a system that filtered out works not needing copyright’s protection 
from works that did. This change is as traditional a contour of copyright as 
any could be and the claim is that that change in 1976 of a traditional 
contour of copyright gets us First Amendment review, and if we get First 
Amendment review, then the presumption of deference that led the Eldred 
Court goes out and ordinary First Amendment review means we win. Or at 
least we get Congress inspired enough to re-create a filter, to attempt to 
take the full range of works burdened by the extension of copyright and 
separate out those that need or could benefit from the continued extension 
from those that would not. This opens a way for those works that would not 
normally to pass to the public domain, so that the burden of copyright is 
narrowly tailored to those which would actually benefit from an extended 
term. 
 
I do not predict the Court will go our way. I remember when I was 
explaining Eldred to one of the most cynical members of the American 
Legal Academy, he said to me, “while you have convinced me that you are 
right, that under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence you should win, 
according to the rules the Supreme Court has enunciated for limiting 
Congress’ powers, and that this is precisely the kind of case where 
Congress’ power has gone too far, when is the last time that the Supreme 
Court ever ruled against all the money in the world?” And I said to him, 
“that is an extremely cynical, boring way to think about the way courts 
function. I do not think that is the way courts function at all”. But I had to 
stop and think, when is the last time the Court ruled against all the money 
in the world? Even when they struck down segregation, it was only a bunch 
of poor, southern racists they were actually acting against. The major 
actions have never been, in this context, where all the money in the world 
is against a bunch of crazy academics. This reminds us perhaps of the 
limits of what courts will do. 
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I offer these stories not to predict anything about the court, but to remind us 
of this question: “Does copyright have limits?” I think properly phrased, 
the answer to that question, right now in the United States, is: “no, it 
doesn’t”. But it is our objective I think to imagine: what if there were 
limits? What would they be for? Why would we have them?  
 
For example, let me tell you a couple of stories about copyright’s affect in 
the United States right now. In 2002, Robert Greenwald produced the 
movie, Uncovered. Uncovered is the story about America’s involvement in 
the Iraq war and the decisions leading to our engagement in that war. In 
2004, Robert Greenwald wanted to produce an updated version of that 
movie, including a one minute clip from an interview the President of the 
United States gave on NBC’s Meet the Press. He requested permission 
from Meet the Press to include the one minute clip in the film. They denied 
him permission. What they said to him initially was, “it’s not very 
flattering to the President”. Now, what is going on in this dynamic? In a 
world where Presidents have fewer press conferences, in a context of 
increasing concentration and therefore vicious competition to get access to 
people like the President, there is a strong incentive for the press to be nice 
to the President, to create a protective space where he knows he can enter 
and speak without these words being used in ways that might embarrass 
him. It privatises the presidency and this is a predictable consequence of 
copyright extending its power and the concentration of the media 
interacting with that extension. 
 
Here is a more dramatic example in this story. In 2004, Robert made 
another film, Outfoxed, about the Fox News Channel. The Fox News 
Channel sells itself as a ‘Fair and balanced news channel’ and you would 
think, if you know anything about the way truth is to function, ‘fair and 
balanced’ would produce ‘truth’. People would understand the truth in such 
a context. There was a careful study done of what people who watched Fox 
News believe about the world. The survey found that the more likely you 
were to watch Fox News Channel, the more likely you were to have 
completely incorrect assumptions about what was happening. 
 
Whatever your view of Fox News or Fox News commentators like Bill 
O’Reilly, this is a significant issue of political import in the United States 
right now. The charge of ‘fair and balanced’ is an issue which has been 
litigated and continues to be a defining feature of how the network thinks 
of itself. To make this film, it was important that Robert Greenwald have 
the right to use clips from this Network. The Network was not going to 
give permission for Greenwald to use these clips, so he needed to rely on a 
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doctrine called ‘fair use’. If these uses were fair he was safe; if they were 
not fair, then he is personally liable – not his corporation – for millions of 
dollars in damages. And here is the trick: you can only know whether the 
uses are ‘fair’ after you have been sued. You face this choice – whether to 
produce the work and risk millions of dollars in personal damage, or not to 
produce the work and stay safe and sound.  
 
Fox’s response to the movie was significant in indicating what it thought 
about the copyright system. Fox called this ‘piracy’. Roger Ales, the 
President of Fox, said, “any news organisation that does not support our 
position on copyright is crazy. Everybody should stand up and say these 
people don’t have the right to take our product any more; it puts journalism 
at risk”. The idea that pointing out that someone is inconsistent puts 
journalism at risk shows just how far the concept of journalism has moved 
from what its ideals should be. 
 
The risk here, the real risk, is a system that creates huge legal exposure for 
someone who wants to make political commentary about one of the most 
important forces in American political life. That is the free speech issue 
copyright risks. But it is not just that issue which is important, for of 
course, Fox presents the other side of the copyright question quite well. It 
was hugely successful as a film in the United States. DVD sales were No. 1 
in Amazon for months. That drove penetration into theatres that otherwise 
was never expected. It was not a big success here in Australia. One reason 
we might speculate about that has to do with the decision made by certain 
companies about whether advertisements would be permitted. For when the 
film was advertised or advertising was sought for the film, certain 
organisations owned by this corporation refused to run the ad. You could 
not advertise this film that was critical of Fox because the owner of the 
advertiser sought not to have that message displayed. This is the monopoly 
issue that copyright raises – free speech and the monopoly issue rolled into 
one. 
 
On 17 January 2005, the Australian ran a story about Sir Cliff Richard, the 
most successful singles’ artist in British history who launched a campaign 
to complain about copyright. His fifty year-old recordings are about to 
enter the public domain, and to cost the record companies a great deal of 
money – close to $1 billion estimated by this article appearing in the 
Australian. They claim that it is unfair, fundamentally unfair, that these 
copyrights expire. Why is it unfair? Because when his songs were recorded 
Sir Cliff Richard was promised fifty years of protection. He got it – 50 
years of protection. His response is, yes, but the United States gives us 95 
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years of protection. But when he recorded his material, the United States 
gave him 56 years of protection. It then dollopped on another forty-some 
years to 95 years of protection. What does this unfairness boil down to? 
The unfairness is: it is unfair for you not to pay us twice, when the United 
States has paid us twice for the work which we have copyrighted.  
 
It is not surprising that particular famous artists would be keen to extend 
the copyright term. We can predict that will always happen. We can predict 
that if any of us were as lucky as Sir Cliff Richard was to be successful in 
this world, we would be arguing to extend the term of our copyrights. What 
is surprising, is not Sir Cliff Richard, but that the other side of this debate is 
essentially invisible.  
 
The US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 2004 (Cth) which was 
passed recently (increasing the term of existing works) is probably thought 
of as a piracy of the public domain. Yet it too did not produce politically – 
as opposed to some particular activists – even a whimper. Not even to 
consider the modest suggestion that a means was adopted to separate out 
those works that need the benefit of an extended term, like Sir Cliff 
Richard, from those works that do not need any benefit from an extended 
term because they are commercially unavailable and just locked up under 
the existing copyright regime. Not even that idea was considered, and that 
is a reflection of how blind we, as cultures, have become to the balance 
which defines this debate. We need to recognise that because of this 
extraordinary explosion in technology we are at a critical time and have the 
opportunity to realise the potential innovation of this network, so long as 
this extraordinary and potential innovation is not zapped by monopolies.  
 
Copyright, designed to benefit authors, if allowed to become too powerful 
becomes the tool of monopolies, and again we ask the question, “Does 
copyright have limits?” It does have limits. These limits are for us, 
forgotten. The powerful have used their power to buy the power to silence 
those who would question this explosion in power. And we stand silent. 
We have restored the Conger, precisely the entity we originally in our 
tradition designed copyright to dissolve; indeed worse than the Conger, for 
the power exercised is greater by the monopolists. Never in our history 
have fewer exercised more power over our culture than now. Nobody 
noticed this happening; nobody acts effectively to stop it. Yet the question 
which opens this lecture is an invitation for us to remember how we as a 
culture discovered those limits and how we could recreate them again. 
